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Sanism, Social Science, and the 
Development of Mental 
Disability Law Jurisprudence 
Michael L. Perlin, J.D. and Deborah A. 
Dorfman, J.D. 
This article examines the way that "sanist" attitudes 
(attitudes driven by the same kind of irrational, uncon-
scious and bias-driven stereotypes exhibited in racist and 
sexist decisionmaking) lead to "pretextual" decisions (in 
which dishonest testimony is either explicitly or implicitly 
accepted) in mental disability law jurisprudence. In con-
junction with these sanist ends, social science data is teleo-
logically employed by legal decisionmakers, so that it is 
privileged when it supports a conclusion that the fact-finder 
wishes to reach but subordinated when it questions such 
a conclusion. The article examines recent Supreme Court 
cases in an effort to determine the extent of domination 
of such sanist behavior, and concludes by offering several 
prescriptions to scholars and policymakers so as to best 
avoid sanism's pernicious power. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Any investigation of the roots or sources of mental disability jurisprudence has to 
factor in society's irrational mechanisms that govern our dealings with mentally 
disabled individuals. 1 The entire legal system makes assumptions about mentally 
disabled people-who they are, how they got that way, what makes them different, 
What there is about them that lets us treat them differently, and whether their con-
ditions are immutable. 2 These assumptions-that reflect our fears and apprehen-
sions about mental disability, the mentally disabled, and the possibility that we may 
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become mentally disabled3-are often non-reflective, self-referential and purpor-
tedly "common sensical";4 they reflect further the pernicious effect of heuristic 
reasoning and thinking (implicit cognitive devices used to simplify complex infor-
mation processing tasks and which frequently lead to distorted and systematically 
erroneous decisions). 5 The most important question of all-why do we feel the 
way we do about these people?-is rarely asked. 6 
These conflicts lead us to inquire about the extent to which social science data 
does (or should) inform the development of mental disability law jurisprudence. 
After all, if we agree that mentally disabled individuals can be treated differently 
(because of their mental disability, or because of behavioral characteristics that flow 
from that disability), it would appear logical that this difference in legal treatment 
is-or should be-founded on some sort of empirical data base that confirms both 
the existence and the causal role of such difference. Yet, we tend to ignore, subordinate 
or trivialize behavioral research in this area, especially when acknowledging that 
such research would be cognitively dissonant with our intuitive (albeit empirically 
flawed) views. 7 
One might optimistically expect, though, that this gloomy picture is now subject 
to change. First, scholars such as John Monahan and Laurens Walker have con-
structed a jurisprudence of "social science in law," articulating coherent theories 
about the role of social science data and research in the trial process and outlining 
specific proposals for obtaining, evaluating and establishing the findings of such 
research.8 Second, ·a recent series of social and political developments (primarily, 
3 See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein & Jay Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defence"-Why Not? 72 YALE L. J. 853, 
868-69 (1963); Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and Homelessness: A Story of Margi-
nalization, 28 Hous, L. REV. 63, 108 (1991) (on society's fears of mentally disabled persons), and id. 
at 93 n .174 ("[W]hile race and sex are immutable, we all can become mentally ill, homeless, or both. 
Perhaps this illuminates the level of virulence we experience here") (emphasis in original). On the way 
that public fears about the purported link between mental illness and dangerousness "drive the formal 
laws and policies governing mental disability jurisprudence," see John Monahan, Mental Disorder and 
Violent Behavior: Perceptions and Evidence, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 511,511 (1992) . 
• Richard Sherwin, Dialects and Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical Fields in the Law of Confessions, 136 
U. PA. L. REV. 729 (1988) (discussing "ordinary common sense" (OCS) . See also, Michael L. Perlin, 
Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. (1992), manuscript 
at 28 n.69 ("My criticism here is not of true 'common sense,' but of self-referential pronouncements 
made under the guise of being 'commonsensical,' a kind of faux common sense"). 
' Michael Saks & Robert Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 123 (1980-81); Michael L. Perlin, Are Courts Competent to Decide Competency Questions? 
Stripping the Facade from United States v. Charters, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 957,966 n.46 (1990). 
' But see Perlin, supra note 1; Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary 
Common Sense" and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REV. 3 (1990). 
1 See, generally J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court and 
Psychology, 66 IND. L. J. 137 (1990). 
8 See e.g., Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific Methodology as Legal Precedent, 76 
CALIF. L. REV. 877 (1988); John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Judicial Use of Social Science Research, 
15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 571 (1991) . Similarly illuminating are Gary Melton's and Michael Saks' insights 
into "psychological jurisprudence" (the study of community and cultural norms through structures that 
create or sustain social behavior consistent with values that promote human welfare). See, e.g., Gary 
Melton, The Law Is a Good Thing (Psychology Is, Too): Human Rights in Psychological Jurisprudence, 
16 LA w & HUM. BEHA v. 381 ( 1992); Gary Melton & Michael Saks, The Law as an Instrument of Socialization 
and Social Structure, in 33 NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION: THE LAW AS A BEHAVIORAL INSTRUMENT 
235 (Gary B. Melton ed. 1985). 
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the public awareness of psychiatric hospital deinstitutionalization and its purported 
link to homelessness, and a series of sensational criminal trials in which mental 
status defenses have been raised) have resulted in significantly increased visibility 
of some mentally disabled persons in often-negative ways.9 One might expect that 
litigation and legislation in these areas would draw on social science data in attempt-
ing to answer such questions as, say, the actual impact that deinstitutionalization 
has had on homelessness, or whether experts can knowledgeably testify about criminal 
responsibility in so-called "volitional prong" insanity cases. 10 
And yet, when we attempt to place mental disability law jurisprudence in context, 
we are confronted with a discordant reality: social science is rarely a coherent 
influence on mental disability law doctrine. 11 Rather, the legal system selectively-
teleologically-either accepts or rejects social science data depending on whether 
or not the use of that data meets the a priori needs of the legal system. 12 In other 
words, social science data is privileged when it supports the conclusion the fact 
finder wishes to reach, but it is subordinated when it questions such a conclusion. 13 
It is not enough to simply say, in an almost existential tone, that courts are teleologi-
cal. What we must do next is to try to articulate exactly what ends fact finders 
(both trial and appellate judges) attempt to meet through their manipulation of 
social science data and social science reasoning. 
We contend that these ends are sanist. By this we mean that decisionmaking 
in mental disability law cases is inspired by (and reflects) the same kinds of irrational, 
unconscious, bias-driven stereotypes and prejudices that are exhibited in racist, sexist, 
homophobic and religiously- and ethnically-bigoted decisionmaking. 14 Sanist deci-
sionmaking infects all branches of mental disability law, and distorts mental disability 
jurisprudence. Paradoxically, while sanist decisions are frequently justified as being 
therapeutically-based, sanism customarily results in anti-therapeutic outcomes.15 
9 
Perlin, supra note 3, at 106-08; Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism, " 46 SMU L. REv. ·373, 399-400 
(1992)_. On the ~ole of the media in the dissemination of information in such cases, see Thomas Grisso, 
f.orens1c Evaluations an1 the Fourth Estate, 3 FORENS. REP. 427 (1990). 
See, e.g. , Norman Fmkel, The Insanity Defense: A Comparison of Verdict S chemas, 15 LAW & HUM 
BEHAV. 533, 535 (1991); Richard Rogers, APA 's Position on the Insanity Defense: Empiricism Versus Emotio~ 
nalism, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 840 (1987). 
11 
See _e.g., Jodie English, The Light Between Twilight aruf Dark: Federal Criminal Law and the Volitional 
!nsamty Defe~e, 40 J:IASTINGS L. J. 1, ~0--5~ (1988); P~rlm, supra note 1, at 658 n.256 (federal legislators 
ignored empmcal eVJdence about the msamty defense m the debate leading to the passage of the Insani 
Defense Reform Act of 1984). ty 
12 
See Perlin, supra note 6, at 60-61; Perlin, supra note 4, manuscript at 75-76· Paul Appelb Th 
E . . al Ju . de . S C ' aum, e mpinc rispru nee of the United_ Sta~ upre':!e ourt,_ 13 AM . .J· L. & MED. 335, 341-42 1987 . Tanford, supra note 7, at 157; David Fa1gman, Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding"· E 1} • £' 
~mpin'calComponentofConstitutionallnterpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541,577 (199 l) . · xp nng t e 
SeeTanford, supra note 7, at 157; Faigman, supra note 12, at 581. 
"Perlin, supra note 9, at 374-77. On the phobic base of these fears, see Deborah A D rf " 
in Commitment and Medication Decisionmaking: A Psychoanalytic Perspective Tur O hman, Pretex~s 
Jurisprudential Filter" (unpublished manuscript, awaiting submission) manuscript tig a Therapeuuc 
" See, e.g., David Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing c:nceptions if le cd Sh l . . 
issue) (hereinafter Wexler, Changing); David Wexler, Putting Mental Health 1° t Mg ale O arship (this Th . J . de 16 LA &H no ent Health Law· erapeut1c urispru nee, W UM. BEHAV. 27 (1992) (hereinafterWexl Pu · ) 'T'.,- · 
J , 'T'.,_ LA ..,..~ . er, ttmg ; uu,.RAPEUTIC URISPRUDENCE. • = W AS A • =RAPEUTIC AGENT (David Wexler ed 1990) (h · ft 
JURISPRUDENCE). . erema er lHERAPEUTIC 
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each aspect of the law's development. In Part V, we urge scholars to confront these 
systemic dissonances as a means of creating a coherent framework for the use of 
social science data in mental disability cases. Here we also show how this confron-
tation will help create a mental disability jurisprudence that is truly therapeutic. 
Finally, we conclude with some recommendations for all participants in the mental 
disability law system. 
II. SANISM 
A. lntroduction20 
"Sanism" is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character of other irratio-
nal prejudices that cause (and are reflected in) prevailing social attitudes of racism, 
sexism, homophobia and ethnic bigotry. 21 It infects both our jurisprudence and 
our lawyering practices. Sanism is largely invisible and largely socially acceptable. 
It is based largely upon stereotype, myth, superstition and deindividualization, and 
is sustained and perpetuated by our use of alleged "ordinary common sense" (OCS) 
and heuristic reasoning in an unconscious response to events both in everyday life 
and in the legal process. 
Judges are not immune from sanism. "[E] mbedded in the cultural presuppositions 
that engulf us all, " 22 they express discomfort with social science23 ( or any other 
system that may appear to challenge law's hegemony over society) and skepticism 
about new thinking; this discomfort and skepticism allows them to take deeper refuge 
in heuristic thinking and flawed, non-reflective OCS, both of which perpetuate the 
myths and stereotypes of sanism. 24 
B. Sanism and the Court Process in Mental Disability Law 
Cases 
Jud~~s re~ect and project the conventional morality of the community, and judicial 
dec1s1ons m all areas of civil and criminal mental disability law continue to reflect 
'
0 
~uch of the material infra text accompanying notes 21-29 is adapted from Perlin, supra note 4 _ 
scnpt at 79-83. . ' manu 
21 
The phrase "sanism" was, to the best of our knowledge, coined by Dr. Monon Birnbaum s M 
B. b ..,..h R. h "' S C . . ee onon 1m aum, , , e tg t to , reatment: ome omments on tts Development, in MEDICAL, MORAL AND LEGAL 
ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE 97, 106--07 (Frank Ayd ed. 1974); Koe, 573 F . 2d at 764 S p r 
note 3, at 92-93 (discussing Birnbaum's insights). · ee er m, supra 
22 
Anthony D'Amato, Harmful Speech and the Culture of Indeterminacy 32 WM & MARYL RE 
332 (1991) . ' . · V. 329, 
" Perlin, supra note 6, at 59-61; Michael L. Perlin, Morali,y and Pretextuali,.., p h • 
"O d. C S "u . . R . . . •J, syc tatry and Law· oif r mary ommon ense, ,-,eunstic easonmg, and Cognmve Dissonance 19 BULL AM A p · 
& L. 131, 133-37 (1991). The discomfon that judges often feel in h;ving to decide~- SY?1IA?'-Y 
law cases is often palpable. See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 5 at 991 discussing U . d S ental disability 
~63 F.2d 302,310 (4th Cir 1988) (en bane), cert. den., 494 U.S. 1016 0 990) mte tates v. Chatters, 
Perlin, supra note 6, at 61-69; Perlin, supra note l ; at 718-30. '. 
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and perpetuate sanist stereotypes. 25 Their language demonstrates bias against men-
tally disabled individuals26 and contempt for the mental health professions. 27 
Courts often appear impatient with mentally disabled litigants, ascribing their prob-
lems in the legal process to weak character or poor resolve. Thus, a popular sanist 
myth is that "[m]entally disabled individuals simply don't try hard enough. They 
give in too easily to their basest instincts, and do not exercise appropriate self-
restraint. ''28 
Rarely, if ever, is behavioral or scientific authority cited to support sanist opinions. 29 
As we will show, it is not coincidental that this sort of sanist judicial behavior 
ignores available social science research. Through sanist thinking, judges allow them-
selves to avoid difficult choices in mental disability law cases; their refuge in alleged 
"ordinary common sense" contributes further to the pretextuality that underlies 
much of this area of the law. 
III. SELECTIVE USE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA 
The use of social science data is often met with tremendous resistance by the courts, 
which are frequently skeptical and suspicious of and hostile toward such evidence. 30 
Specifically, the skepticism toward statistical data and evidence about the behavioral 
sciences appears to stem directly from the belief that such data .are not "empirical" 
in the same way that "true" sciences are and therefore are not trustworthy. 31 Social 
science data is seen as overly subjective and vulnerable to researcher bias. 32 
Courts are often threatened by the use of such data. Judges' general dislike of 
25 See Perlin, supra note 9; at 400-04. Not all judicial opinions are sanist. See, e.g., id., at 403--04; 
Perlin, supra note 4, manuscript at 103--04 (citing examples). For more recent examples, see Riggins 
v. Nevada, 112 S.C+.1810 (1992) (trial court's failure to determine need for continued administration 
of antipsychotic medications to insanity-pleading defendant or to make inquiry about reasonable alterna-
tives violated defendant's liberty interest in freedom from such drugs; conviction reversed); Foucha v. 
Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992) (statute that permits continued hospitalization of insanity acquinee 
found to be no longer mentally ill violates due process). · 
26 See, e.g., Com v. Zant, 708 F.2d 549, 569 (11th Cir. 1983), reh. den., 714 F .2d 159 (11th Cir. 
1983), cert. den., 467 U .S. 1220 (1984) (defendant referred to as a "lunatic"); Sinclair v. Wainwright, 
814 F .2d 1516, 1522 (11th Cir., 1987), quoting Shuler v. Wainwright, 491 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(using "lunatic") . 
27 See, e.g. , Commonwealth v. Musolino, 467 A.2d 605 (Pa. Super. 1983) (reversible error for trial 
judge to refer to expert wimesses as "headshrinkers"). Compari State v. Percy, 507 A.2d 955, 956 
(Vt. 1986), app'l after remand, 595 A.2d 248 (Vt. 1990), cert. den., 112 S. Ct. 344 (1991) (conviction 
reversed where prosecutor referred to expert testimony as "psycho-babble"), to Commonwealth v. Cosme, 
575 N .E.2d 726, 731 (Mass. 1991) (not error where prosecutor referred to defendant's expert wimesses 
as "a little head specialist" and a "wizard"). 
28 Perlin, supra note 9, at 396. 
29 See, e.g., People v. LaLone, 437 N .W.2d 611, 613 (Mich. 1989), reh. (1989) (without citation to 
any authority, court found that it is less likely that medical patients will "fabricate descriptions of their 
complaints" than will "psychological patients"); In re Melton, 597 A.2d 892,898 (D.C. 1991) (psychiatric 
predictivity of future dangerousness likened to predictions made by an oncologist as to consequences 
of an untreated and metastasized malignancy); Braley v. State, 741 P.2d 1061, 1064-65 (Wyo. 1987) 
(expert testimony on a homicide defendant's reactions to fear and stress rejected on grounds that such 
emotions are "experienced by all mankind" and thus not related to any body of scientific knowledge) . 
30 Perlin, supra note 23, at 136-37; J. Alexander Tanford & Sarah Tanford, Better Trials Through Science: 
A Defense of Psychologist-Lawyer Collaboration, 66 N. C. L. REV. 7 41, 7 42-46 ( 1988). 
31 See, e.g., David Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law 
as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1010 (1989). 
32 Faigman, supra note 31, at 1016, 1026. 
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social science is reflected in self-articulated claims that they are unable to understand 
the data and are thus unable to apply it properly to a particular case. 33 
This dislike and distrust of social science data has led courts to be teleological 
in their use of this evidence. Social science that enables courts to meet predetermined 
sanist ends is often privileged while data that would require judges to question such 
ends are frequently rejected. 34 Judges often select certain prof erred data that 
adheres to their pre-existing social and political attitudes, and use both heuristic 
reasoning and false OCS in rationalizing such decisions.35 Social science data is 
used pretextually in many cases to rationalize otherwise baseless judicial decis1.ons. 36 
Courts thus will take the literature out of context,37 misconstrue the data or 
evidence being offered,38 read such data selectively,39 and/or inconsistently.40 
Other times, courts choose to flatly reject41 this data or ignore its existence. 42 
In other circumstances, courts simply "rewrite" factual records so as to avoid having 
to deal with social science data that is cognitively dissonant with their OCS.43 
Even when courts do acknowledge the existence and possible validity of studies 
33 
See, e.g., Perlin, supra 'note 5, at 986- 93, discussing decision in United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 
302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en bane), cert. den., 494 U .S. 1016 (1990) (limiting right of pretrial detainees 
to refuse medication). The Charters court rejected as incredulous the possibility that a court could make 
a meaningful distinction between competency to stand trial and competency to engage in medication 
decisionmaking: 
[Such a distinction] must certainly be of such sublety and complexity as to tax perception by the 
most skilled medical or psychiatric professionals ... To suppose that it is a distinction that can be 
fairly discerned and applied even by the most skilled judge on the basis of an adversarial fact-finding 
proceedings taxes credulity. 
fharters, 863 F.2d at 310. 
• Perlin, supra note 23, at 136--37; Appelbaum, supra note 12, at 341; Tanford, supra note 7, at 144-50; 
r,aigman, supra note 12, at 581. 
36 
On the courts' heuristic use of social science data, see Perlin, supra note 4, manuscript at 7 4-77. ' 
See Perlin, supra note 4, manuscript at 75-76, discussing decisions in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U .S. 
880 (1983) (testimony as to future dangerousness admissible at penalty phase in capital punishment 
c~se), McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (rejecting statistical evidence offered to show racial 
~1Scrimination in death penalty prosecutions), and Charters, (curtailing rights of criminal defendant await-' 
\?g ~al to refuse antipsychotic medication). 
"' Fa1gman, supra note 12, at 577. 
"Id. at 581. 
Katheryn Katz, Majoritarian Morality and Parental Rights. 52 ALB. L. REV. 405,461 (1988) (on courts' 
reading of impact of parents' homosexuality in custody decisions); Tanford, supra note 7, at 153-54. 
See, e.g., Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 571 n.4 (1986) (defendant's right to fair trial not denied 
Where uniformed state troopers sat in front of spectator section in courtroom; court rejected contrary 
~mpirical study, and based decision on its own "experience and common sense") . 
• 
0 
See, e.g., Thomas Hafemeister & Gary Melton, The Impact of Social Science Research on the Judiciary, 
!? REFORMING THE LAW: IMPACT OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT REsEARCH 27 (Gary B. Melton ed. 1987). 
42 Se~, e.g., Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 897-902. 
Faigman, supra note 12, at 581. See, e.g., Watkins v. Sanders, 449 U.S. 341 (1981) (refusal of courts 
~? acknowledge social science research on ways that jurors evaluate and misevaluate eyewitness testimony) . 
The classic example is Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the court in Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 
~OS-10 (1979) (approving more relaxed involuntary civil commitment procedures for juveniles than ;r adults). See, e.g., Gail Perry & Gary Melton, Precedential Value of Judicial Notice of Social Facts: 
arham as an Example, 22 J. FAM. L. 633, 645 (1984) : 
The Parham case is an example of the Supreme Court's taking advantage of the free rein on social 
facts to promulgate a dozen or so of its own by employing one tentacle of the judicial notice doctrine. 
The Court's opinion is filled with social facts of questionable veracity, accompanied by the authority 
to P~opel these facts into subsequent \:ase law and, therefore, a spiral of less than rational legal policy 
making. 
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that take a contrary position from their decisions, this acknowledgement is frequently 
little more than mere "lip service. " 44 
IV. SANISM AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 
Sanist attitudes toward social science permeate all aspects of the mental disability 
trial process. Here, we consider specifically these attitudes in the contexts of involun-
tary civil commitment cases, cases involving the right to refuse antipsychotic medica-
tion, and in criminal trial determinations of incompetency to stand trial and the 
insanity defense. 
A. Involuntary Civil Commitment 
In the involuntary civil commitment process, courts often selectively use social science 
data in order to rationalize sanist decisions to either commit patients or deny their 
petitions for release. Thus, while involuntary civil commitment cases ostensibly turn 
on the question of whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the patient 
is mentally ill and, as a result of that mental illness, is dangerous to herself or 
others ( or, in some jurisdictions, gravely disabled), other factors frequently dominate 
the decisionmaking proc;:ess. Thus, an entirely different question-whether the 
patient is likely to· self-medicate in the community45-is frequently the dispositive 
"swing" issue in contested commitment cases. 
In deciding such cases, courts will privilege psychiau-ic testimony that implicitly 
suggests that forensic experts have the power to make this prediction in spite of 
an utter absence of any behavioral evidence to support ei~er the premise that psychia-
trists can accurately make this prediction, or whether there is any correlation between 
this conclusion and future dangerousness. 46 This privileging serves overtly sanist 
and pretextual ends; it allows courts to overcommit individuals who do not meet 
statutory commitment criteria where judges feel "it's the right thing to do. " 47 This 
puts a false patina of testimonial respectability on decisions. that are grounded neither 
in social science nor in coherent legal doctrine. 
44 See, e. g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229-30 (1990) (prisoners retain limited liberty interest 
in right to refuse forcible administration of antipsychotic medications), in which the majority acknow-
ledges, and emphasizes in response to the dissent, the harmful, and perhaps fatal, side-effects of the 
drugs. The court also stressed the "deference that is owed to medical professionals ... who possess 
... the requisite knowledge and expertise to determine whether the drugs should be used." Id. at 230 
n.12. Compare id. at 247-49 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (suggesting that the 
majority's side effects acknowledgement is largely illusory). But compare Riggins v. Nevada, 112 U.S. 
1810 (1992) discussed infra text accompanying notes 69-78. 
Scholars who recommend a critical reevaluation of the way that that social. science data is received, 
see, e.g., Monahan & Walker, supra note 8, at 582-83, are similarly frequently ignored. See infra Part 
IV. 
45 Perlin, supra note 4, manuscript at 83-95; Michael L. Perlin, Reading the Supreme Court's Tea Leaves: 
Predicting Judicial Behavior in Civil and Criminal Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 12 AM. J. FORENS. 
PSYCHIATRY 37, 50-51 (1991). 
46 Perlin, supra note 4, manuscript at 88-89. 
47 Michael Saks, Expert Wimesses, Nonexpert Wimesses, and Nonwimess Experts, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
291,293 (19.90), discussing trial judge's explanation to mental health law students as to why he ordered 
commitment in individual cases notwithstanding a failure of proof: 
I guess you noticed that some of these people were not fit subjects for commitment under the 
statute. But, after all, I am a human being. I care what is best for these people, and I have to 
do what I think is right. 
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Even where courts seek to determine whether statutorily-mandated dangerousness 
criteria are met, dispositions inevitably turn on future dangerousness predictions, 
in spite of an overwhelming data base questioning the accuracy of psychiatric predic-
tions in -this area.48 The paradox here is a pointed one: judges continue to cite 
approvingly observations on the state of psychiatric knowledge more than 35 years 
out of date49 notwithstanding a broad array of recent and available research suggest-
ing impressive improvement in psychiatric diagnosis and testing. 50 Yet, they dog-
gedly endorse-and "routinely ·and unquestioningly accept[]"51-the continued 
use of psychiatric predictions of dangerousness, notwithstanding the empirical record 
demonstrating the inaccuracy of most such predictions. The teleological use of this 
paradox is demonstrated in In re Melton's comparison of an oncologist's ability to 
predict the future prognosis of a cancer patient to a psychiatrist's ability to predict 
future dangerousness. 52 Here, psychiatry was placed on an equal footing with general 
medicine where such testimonial privileging served sanist ends. 
Similarly, courts frequently teleologically ignore social science so as to justify con-
clusions that failure to involuntarily commit a person will lead causally to that per-
son's future homelessness,53 or to sustain commitments based upon legislation that 
broadens the scope of committability to include individuals who are " gravely dis-
abled" and thus deemed incapable of caring for themselves. 54 
Sanist treatment of social science data is common even in cases that are generally 
nonpretextual. Thus, in Zinermon v. Burch, 55 the Supreme Court recognized that 
a patient's "voluntary" status is often illusory, and held that a patient could maintain 
a civil rights suit alleging that he had a right to a due process hearing prior to 
•• , Barefoot, 463 U .S. at 916-19 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). 
9 
See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 1789 (1992) ·(O'Connor, J., concurring in part & 
concurring in judgment) (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 365 n.13 (1983), quoting 
Greenwood v. United States, 350 U .S. 366, 375 (1956), on the "present state of [psychiatric) knowledge 
and therapy regarding mental disease"); id. at 1801 ('Ibomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Jones' further 
quotation of Greenwood as to the "uncertainty of diagnosis ... and tentativeness of professional judg-· 
ment"). See also Nesbitt v. Community of South Dade, Inc., 467 So. 2d 711, 717 (Fla. Dist. App. 
1985) Oorgenson, J., dissenting), attacking the credibility of psychiatry and contrasting it to the validity 
of other medical evidence: 
The science of psychiatry represents the penultimate grey area .. . A substantial body of literature 
suggests that the psychiatric field cannot even agree on approopriate diagnosis, much less recommend 
a course of treatment. Unlike a physician's diagnosis, which can be verified by x-ray, surgery, etc., 
the psychiatrist cannot verify his diagnosis, treatment, or predicted prognosis except by long-term 
50 
follow-up and reporting. . 
51 
See Perlin, supra note l, at 658-63 (citing developments) . 
See Marilyn Hammond, Predictions of Dangerousness in Texas: Psychotherapists' Conflicting Duties, Their 
;,0 tential Liability, and Possible Solutions, 12 ST. MARY'S L. J. 141, 150 n.71 (1980). 
53 
597 A.2d 892,898 (D.C. 1991) (upholding civil commitment). 
See, e.g., In re Melton, 565 A.2d 635, 649 (D.C. 1989) (Schwalb, J., dissenting), superseded on rehearing, 
~97 A.2d 788 (D.C. 1991), discussed in Perlin, supra note 4, manuscript at 107--08. 
This category includes those unable to find and maintain housing, unable to feed themselves, or unable 
to effectively self-medicate for both physical as well as mental problems. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. 
§27-10-107 (1982); MD. HEALTH GEN. CODE ANN. §§10-617, 10-805 (f) (1982 & 1987 Supp'.); see 
also Mary Durham & John LaFond, The Impact of Expanding a State 's Therapeutic Commitment Authority, 
~EUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 15, at 121. In deciding such cases, courts frequently link a 
~ding of "gravely disabled" to future dangerousness in order to justify commitment. See, e.g., People 
in the Interest of King, 795 P.2d 273 (Colo. App. 1990) (even though expert testimony indicated patient 
Was not necessarily dangerous in supervised setting, evidence sustained finding of "dangerousness" so 
~s to sustain long-term treatment petition). 
494 U.S. 113 (1990) . 
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his "voluntary" admission to a mental health facility. 56 Yet, in support of this 
decision, Justice Blackmun noted that "the very nature of mental illness" makes 
it "foreseeable" that such a person "will be unable to understand any proferred 
'explanation and disclosure of the subject matters' of the forms that such a person 
is asked to sign, and will be unable 'to make a knowing and willful decision' whether 
to consent to admission. " 57 
It is ironic that Zinermon-the first Supreme Court case to consider the multiple 
textures of "voluntariness" -still retains the concept of a unitary definition of the 
impact of mental illness on competency. Competency is not a "fixed state;" a person 
competent for some legal purposes may be incompetent for others at the same time; 
incompetency and mental illness are not identical states. 58 Although the ultimate 
impact of Zinermon on actual practice is still not clear, 59 it shows that, even in 
the context of a "generally sensitive" decision60 by the member of the court with 
the best understanding of psychological concepts and constructs, 61 social science 
data is still misused in at least a partially sanist way. 
B. The Right to Refuse Medication 
The teleological use of social science data is also prevalent in decisions in cases 
involving the right to refuse antipsychotic medication. 62 For the past 15 years, 
this issue has dominated the legal-medical debate and has been seen as "the most 
controversial issue in forensic psychiatry today. " 63 Advocates of the use of such 
'
6 Id. at 130-37. 
51 Id. at 132 (emphasis added). 
58 See, e.g., Paul Appelbaum & Loren Roth, Clinical Issues in the Assessment of Competency, 138 AM. 
J. PSYCHIATRY 1462, 1465 (1981); Loren Roth, Alan Meisel & Charles Lidz, Tests of Competence to 
Consent UJ Treatment, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279, 279 (1977). See also In re LaBelle, 107 Wash. 2d 
196, 728 P. 2d 138, 146 (1986) ("the mere fact that an individual is mentally ill does not mean that 
the person so affected is incapable of making a rational choice with respect to his or her need for treat-
ment"). 
59 Compare Bruce Winick, Competency to Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
Analysis of Zinermon v. Burch, in ESSAYS IN TuERAPElITIC JURISPRUDENCE 83, 130 (David Wexler & 
Bruce Winick eds. 1991) (lower courts should be "hesitant to read Zinermon's language broadly"), UJ 
1 PERLIN, supra note 17, §3.69, at 60-61 (1991 pocket part) (speculating that, given the growing fear 
of litigation by public mental hospital staff personnel, Zinermon may have a "further reductive effect 
on state hospital admissions"). 
60 1 PERLIN, supra note 17, §3.69 at 60 (1991 pocket part). 
61 See Gary B. Melton, Realism in Psychology and Humanism in Law: Psycholegal Studies at Nebraska, 
69 NEB. L. REV. 251, 272-73 (1990) Gustice Blackmun is "Court's scientist" and "Court's moral 
authority"). 
62 As with involuntary civil commitment decisions, social factors play a significant role in institutional 
medication decisionmaking as well. See, e.g., Paul Benson, Factors Associated With Antipsychotic Drug 
Prescribing by Southern Psychiatrists, 21 MED. CARE 639 (1983) (patients' race, occupation and marital 
status found to be significant during process of prescribing antipsychotic medications); Ira Sommers 
& Deborah Baskin, The Prescription of Psychiatric Medications in Prison: Psychiatric Versus Labeling Perspec-
tives, 7 JUST. Q. 739 (1990) (decision to medicate mildly impaired prison inmates influenced by social 
factors). 
63 Michael L. Perlin, The Right to Refuse Treatment in a Criminal Law Setting, in FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY: 
A COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK (R. Rosner ed. 1992) (in press), manuscript at 1, quoting, in part, Jonathan 
Brant, Pennhurst, Romeo, and Rogers: The Burger Court and Mental Health Law Reform Litigation, 4 
J. LEG. MED. 323 (1983). See generally 2 PERLIN, supra note 17, Chapter 5; Michael L. Perlin, Decoding 
Right to Refuse Treatment Law, 16 INT'LJ. L. & PSYCHIATRY (1992) (in press). 
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medication point to its benefits while critics point out the serious neurological side 
effects that can result from these drugs. 64 As a result of this debate, the courts 
have the opportunity to "choose sides;" thus, if they so choose, they can critically 
assess the empirical data, or, they can demur to the evidence and refuse to engage 
in a scholarly discourse over such data. 65 
Such was the case in Washington v. Harper in which the Court answered the 
question of whether a convicted prisoner could be forcibly medicated against his 
will. In providing defendant with a limited remedy, the majority in Harper selectively 
chose to privilege those aspects of the data available on the effects of antipsychotic 
drugs that discussed the benefits of such medication, while at the same time acknow-
ledging but discounting66 the potential harmful and debilitating effects of these 
drugs.61 
Harper thus accommodated social science evidence with an important strand of 
the Supreme Court's penological jurisprudence: "prison security concerns will, vir-
tually without exception, trump individual autonomy interests. " 68 
The court's social science jurisprudence seemed to take a dramatic turn this term, 
though, in Riggins v. Nevada. 69 Riggins held that the use of antipsychotic drugs 
violated defendant's right to fair trial (at which he had raised the insanity defense), 
citing Harper's side-effects language, and construing Harper to require "an overriding 
iustification and a determination of medical appropriateness" prior to forcibly admi-
nistering antipsychotic medications to a prisoner.70 It focused on what might be 
called the "litigational side-effects" of antipsychotic drugs, and discussed the possibi-
lity that the drug use might have "compromised" the substance of the defendant's 
trial testimony, his interaction with counsel, and his comprehension of the trial. 71 . 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy (the author of Harper) took an even 
bolder position. He would not allow the use of antipsychotic medication to make 
a defendant competent to stand trial "absent an extraordinary showing" on the state's 
Pan, and noted further that he doubted this showing could be made "given our 
64 
The disagreement is seen most pointedly in United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) 
}fn bane), cert. den., 494 U.S. 1016 (1990), and Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990). 
•• See Perlin, supra note 5, at 991 (criticizing Charters). 
See Harper, 494 U.S. at 240 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part): 
The Court relies heavily on the brief filed by the American Psychiatric Association and the Washington 
State Psychiatric Association ... to discount the severity of these drugs. However, medical findings 
discussed in other briefs support conclusions of the Washington Supreme Court and challenge the 
reliability of the Psychiatrists' Brief. 
'?0 mpare, e.g., id. at 230 (majority relies on Psychiatrists' brief for proposition that tardive dyskinesia 
~s found in 10-25% of hospitalized patients), to id. at 239 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting 
!~ part) ( chances greater than one in four of patient developing tardive dyskinesia, and rate is increasing). 
In Harper, both the state and the defense submitted studies discussing drug side-effects. Although 
both sets of studies acknowledged the side-effects' seriousness, they disagreed on how pervasive they 
:ere in institutional populations. See id. at 229. 
•• 2 PERLIN, supra note 17, §5.64A, at 64 (1991 pocket part). 
112 S. Ct. 1810 ( 1 992). Even though Riggins might appear to be more appropriately discussed as 
a "criminal trial process" case, we have chosen to consider it here so as to illuminate its relationship 
to Harper. See generally Michael L. Perlin, Riggins v. Nevada: Forced Medication Collides Wirh the Right 
~ a Fair Trial, 16 NEWSLETTER AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. (Dec. 1992) (in press), 
71 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815. 
Id. at 1816. 
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present understanding of the properties of these drugs."72 Justice Thomas dissented, 
suggesting (1) the administration of the drug might have increased the defendant's 
cognitive ability, 73 (2) since Riggins had originally asked for medical assistance 
(while a jail inmate, he had "had trouble sleeping" and was "hearing voices"), 
it could not be said that the state ever "ordered" him to take medication, 74 
(3) if Riggins had been aggrieved, his proper remedy was a §1983 civil rights action,75 
and ( 4) under the majority's language, a criminal conviction might be reversed 
in cases involving "penicillin or aspirin. " 76 
It is not clear whether Riggins is teleological. Riggins differs importantly from 
Harper in that the court treated Harper as a prison security case while it read Riggins 
as a fair trial case; yet, this difference in the litigants' legal status self-evidently has 
no effect on the physiological or neurological potential impact of the drugs in ques-
tion. Nevertheless, the side effects language in Harper (subordinated there because 
of security reasons) is privileged in Riggins (where such issues are absent) by nature 
of the court's consideration of the question in the context ofa fair trial issue. Thomas's 
opinion raises grave issues for defense counsel; had his position prevailed, would 
• concerned and competent defense lawyers feel as if they were assuming a risk in 
ever seeking psychiatric help for an awaiting-trial defendant? His analogizing antipsy-
chotic drug side effects to penicillin or aspirin may be disingenuous or it may be 
cynical. What is clear is that nowhere in the lengthy corpus of "right to refuse treat-
ment" litigation is this position ever seriously raised. 77 Its use here appears, again, 
to reflect the sanist use of "social science." 
C. The Criminal Trial Process 
Courts tend to be even more sanist in their decisions in mental disability cases 
that arise in the criminal contexts than in civil cases. 78 Thus, the sanist use of 
social science in criminal cases involving the mentally ill is even more teleological 
than in civil matters. This selectivity is exemplified in cases involving issues such 
as incompetency to stand trial, insanity determinations, and post-insanity acquittal 
commitment and release hearings. 
"Id. at 1817 (Kennedy,J., concurring) . 
73 Id. at 1822-23 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Trial testimony had indicated that Riggins' daily drug regimen 
(800 mgs. of Mellaril) was enough to "tranquilize an elephant." Id. at 1819 (Kennedy, J., concurring), 
quoting trial record. ' 
74 Id. at 1823-24 (Thomas,J., dissenting). 
" Id. at 1825-26. At his trial, Riggins had been sentenced to death. 
76 Id. at 1826. 
77 The only case in which a similar issue is raised is Matter of Salisbury, 524 N.Y.S. 2d 352, 354 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1988), holding that prior court authorization was not necessary before a state mental hospital 
could administer antibiotics to a patient, citing "overwhelming public policy considerations" that made 
it "imperative" that hospitals could perform such "routine, accepted, non-major medical treatment which 
poses no significant risk, discomfort, or trauma to the patient." Salisbury has never been cited in any 
subsequent case nor has it been mentioned in the law review literature. 
78 See Perlin, supra note 9, at 402-03 (criminal trial process "riddled with sanist myths and stereotypes"); 
Perlin, supra note 4, manuscript at 95-103 (discussing sanism in the incompetency to stand trial 
process). 
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1. Incompetency to Stand Trial (1ST) Determinations79 
Courts often discourage and are hostile to pleas of incompetency based on a fear 
that defendants are feigning80 in an attempt to ultimately avoid criminal responsibi-
lity. 81 This may explain why the states have been so remarkably laggard in imple-
menting the 1972 decision in Jackson v. lndiana82 in which the Supreme Court 
ruled that IST defendants could not be maintained in maximum security indefinitely 
if it we.re not substantially probable that they would gain their competency to stand 
trial within the "foreseeable future. " 83 
Mentally disabled defendants are also often forcibly medicated so as to be "made 
competent" to stand trial, in spite of the possibility that the medications in question 
might cause severe side-effects and, in specific cases, a lack of evidence that the 
medication in question will actually serve to meet the expected end. Thus, in United 
States v. Charters, 84 the Fourth Circuit held that the "substantial professional judg-
ment" standard85 sufficiently protected defendant's liberty interests in seeking to 
refuse forced medication. 86 Although the court briefly acknowledged the possibility 
of side-effects, it quickly dismissed the magnitude of their potential harm by noting 
that they were simply "one element" to be weighed in a best-interests decision. 87 
Here the court conceded that it did not do an "exhaustive analysis" of the conflicting 
scientific literature before it, demurring to the literature's importance: 
It suffices to observe that, while there is universal agreement in the pro-
fessional discipline that side-effects always exist as a risk, there is wide disagree-
ment within those disciplines as to the degree of their severity.88 
In the course of its decision, the court revealed its "apprehensiveness about dealing 
With underlying social, psychodynamic, and political issues that form the overt and 
79 
80 
See generally Perlin, supra note 4, manuscript at 48-53, 68-73, 95-103; ~erlin, supra note 5. 
See Stephen Golding et al, Assessment and Conceptualization of Competency to Stand Trial: Preliminary 
Data on the Interdisciplinary Fitness Review, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 321 (1984); Richard Rogers, J. Roy 
Gillis & R. Michael Bagby, The SIRS as a Measure of Malingering: Cross Validation of a Correctional 
Sample, 8 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 85 (1990). The best recent evidence suggests that feigning is statistically 
rare, and usually identifiable. See, e.g., David Schretlen & Hal Arkowitz, A Psychological Test Battery 
to Detect Prison Inmates Who Fake Insanity or Mental Retardation, 8 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 75 (I 990) (92-95% 
of all subjects correctly classified as either faking or non-faking); Dewey Cornell & Gary Hawk, Clinical 
Presentation of Malingerers Diagnosed by Experienced Forensic Psychologists, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 375, 
~81-83 (1989) (feigning attempted in fewer than 8% of cases studied). 
See, e.g., State v. Evans, 586 N.E.2d 1042 (Ohio 1992); State v. Sharkey, 821 S.W.2d 544, 546 
(Mo. App. 1991); Blacklock v. State, 820 S.W. 2d 882, 884--85 (Tex. App. 1991), petit. for discret. 
~ev. filed (1992); State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724,727 (Utah App. 1991). For the most recent example 
in a Supreme Court opinion in a case involving an insanity acquittee, see Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 
~- Ct. 1780 (1992), at 1796 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), and at 1802 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
83 406 U.S. 715 (1972). 
Id. at 738. Thirteen years after Jackson was decided, it remained not implemented in almost half 
the states. See Bruce Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 921, 940 
tl985) . 
., 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en bane), cert. den., 494 U.S. 1016 (1990). 
86 See Youngbergv.·Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322-23 (1982). 
87 Charters, 863 F.2d at 307-08. 
88 
Id. at 310. 
Id. at 311. While this is certainly true, this does not excuse the court from refusing to critically analyze 
te scientific research in corning to its ultimate decision. See Perlin, supra note 5, at 990--92; compare 
_onahan & Walker, supra note 8, at 582-83 (setting out steps to be used by courts in analyzing social 
science evidence) . • 
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hidden agendas in any right-to-refuse case,"89 a problem especially pointed where 
the right-to-refuse question arises in a criminal context. The court's decision further 
incorporated a broad array of heuristic devices in a way that led to the trivialization 
and misuse of the social science data before it. 90 
2. Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (NGR/) Determinations91 
In the past decade, the impact of the Hinckley acquittal has increasingly led to 
attacks on the insanity defense by legislators, prosecutors, the courts, and members 
of the general public.92 The caselaw reflects incessant judicial disparagement of 
the plea, of expert testimony in support of defendants asserting the plea, and of 
social science data that could help illuminate the "myths" that have grown up about 
the insanity defense. 93 
Distrust of and selective use of social science data also surfaces in cases involving 
the recommitment of insanity acquittees. As a result of the use of distorted heuristic 
cognitive devices,94 ego defenses,95 and sociopolitical pressure,96 courts are par-
ticuhirly sanist and teleological in their consideration of social science research in 
these cases. 97 
More recently, Justice Thomas's recent opinion in Foucha v. Louisiana98 is a 
textbook case of sanist behavior in a social science setting. Dissenting from a decision 
holding that retention of non-mentally ill insanity acquittees in a forensic mental 
89 Perlin, supra note 5, at 966. 
90 Perlin, supra note 4, manuscript at 73- 74. 
91 S ee generally Perlin, supra note 1; Perlin, supra note 6: 
92 Perlin, supra note 1, at 609- 23. 
93 United States v. Lyons, 731 F .2d 243, 248-49 (5th Cir. 1984): 
A majority of psychiatrists now believe that "they do not possess sufficient accurate scientific bases 
for measuring a person's capacity for self-control or for calibrating the impairment of that capacity 
... In addition, the risks of fabrication and "moral mistakes" in administering the insanity defense 
are greatest when the experts and the jury are asked whether the defendant has the capacity to " control" 
himself or whether he could have " resisted" the criminal impulse. 
Compare id., 739 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1984) (Rubin, J., dissenting) . 
94 Perlin, supra note 6, at 12-22. 
9
' D. Dorfman, supra note 14. 
96 See, e.g., Final Report of the National Institute of M ental Health Ad Hoc Forensic Advisory Panel, 12 
MENT. & PHYS. DIS. L. RPTR. 77, 96 ( 1988) (in the aftermath of the Hinckley acquittal, federal government 
could be counted on, " in controversial cases .. . to oppose any conditional release recommendation") 
(emphasis added) . See also Francois v. Henderson, 850 F. 2d 231, 234 (5th Cir. 198) (testifying doctor 
conceded he may have "hedged" in earlier testimony as to whether or not insanity acquittee could 
be released, "because he did not want to be criticized should [the defendant] be released and then 
commit a criminal act") . . 
97 See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983), approving a post-commitment insanity acquittal 
recommitment scheme that placed the burden on the patient to prove he was no longer mentally ill 
or dangerous, and concluding that it was reasonable to presume that defendant's mental illness continued: 
"Someone whose mental illness was sufficient to lead him to commit a criminal act [at some point 
in the past] is likely to remain ill and in need of treatment." Id. at 366. No social science data base 
supports this assumption; the decision in Jones is utterly indeterminate, and reflects simply the court's 
"unwillingness to contradict public sentiment [soon after the Hinckley acquittal] in such a controversial 
area. " See Louise Dovre, Note, Jones v. United States: Automatic Commitment of Individuals Found Not 
Guilty by Reason of Insanity, 68 MINN. L. REV. 822, 840 (1984) . 
98 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992) . 
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hospital violated the due process clause,99 Thomas based his conclusion that such 
retention was permissible on a variety of sources, including the 1962 commentary 
to the Model Penal Code, a 1933 text by Henry Weihofen, and a 1956 Supreme 
Coun case that had stressed psychiatry's "uncenainty of diagnosis." 100 He focused 
at some length on the possibility of "calculated abuse of the insanity defense" by 
defendants who might feign the plea, and speculated as to · how the public might 
react to the specter of a "serial killer ... returned to the streets immediately after 
trial. .. 101 
Thomas's opinion is astounding for several reasons. First, he relies on legal scholar-
ship that precedes (by 10-40 years) the Coun's application of the due process clause 
to cases involving the institutionalization of mentally disabled criminal defendants. 102 
Second, he relies on a mid-1950's characterization of psychiatric precision in diagno-
sis to suggest that psychiatry is so inexact that the court should discount expert 
testimony saying that an individual once acquitted on grounds of insanity is not 
mentally ill; yet-no doubt because it fits well with his a priori position on the 
case-he finds that psychiatric predictions of dangerousness are sufficiently reliable 
to require the acquittee's future institutionalization (although, here, the experts 
hedged on even this prediction). 103 
Third, Justice Thomas's twin foci on the sanist judges' worst fears about insanity 
acquittees-that they "faked" the insanity defense in the first place and that the 
improper use of the defense will allow for the speedy release of serial killers-is 
a Profound demonstration of how sanist judges distort social science evidence. The 
empirical data is clear-beyond doubt-that the insanity defense is rarely feigned, 
that such attempts are invariably "seen through" by fact finders, and that "success-
ful" acquittees are generally institutionalized in maximum security facilities for far 
longer periods of time than they would have been incarcerated in penal facilities 
had they been convicted of the predicate crimes. 104 His reference to "serial killers" 
is even more perplexing here, given the fact that Foucha's underlying charges were 
burglary and firearms offenses. 
99 
Foucha had been found NGRI of burglary and weapons charges. After he spent four years in a forensic 
hospital, that facility's superintendent recommended that he be released since he "evidenced no signs 
of Psychosis and neurosis" and was in "good shape mentally," notwithstanding a diagnosis of antisocial 
Personality disorder. Id. at 1782. The court below had found that, because Foucha remained dangerous, 
: coul~ be retained in the facility. Id. ~t 1783. Th~ Supreme Court re~~ed;, • . . 
See id. at 1797 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (refemng to "current proV1s1ons of the Amencan Law lnsu-
tute's Model Penal Code); id. at 1801 (citing Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1956), 
for Proposition that there is "uncertainty of diagnosis" in psychiatry); id. at 1806 (citing, inter alia, 
liENRv WEIFHOFEN, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL LAW 294-332 (1933), for proposition that 
there is a long history of states providing for the continued institutionalization of dangerous insanity 
acquittees). Cf. Focha at 1787 n.6 (majority opinion) (charging that sections in question "fail to incorporate 
~~ reflect substantial developments in the relevant decisional law during the intervening three decades"). 
102 
Id. at 1801--02. 
103 See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) . 
See Mary Durham & John Q. LaFond, "Responsibility or Therapy in ~ontrolling the Mentally Ill: 
'Ib.e Relationship Between the Insanity Defense and Involuntary Commitment," (paper presented at 
the annual Law & Society Meeting, May 1992), manuscript at 13: "Neoconservative law reform values 
ps}'chiatric expertise only when it enhances the social control function of the law and denigrates it when 
!~ does not." 
See Perlin, supra note 1, at 646-55 (citing empirical studies and sources). A similar "fear of feigning" 
~a~ als~ have been the motivating force behind J~sti~e O'Conn~r's recent concurrence in Medina v . 
. aliforrua, 112 S. Ct. 2572 (1992) (not •unconsutuuonal to assign burden of proof to defendant in 
lllcompetency to stand trial proceeding), discussed in 3 PERLIN, supra note 17, §14.05A (1992 pocket 
Pan). 
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D. Conclusion 
Jurisprudential developments in this area still predominantly reflect sanist thinking. 
Although the majority opinions in Riggins and Foucha are written in nonsanist tones 
and demonstrate a capacity to integrate social science into mental disability law 
decisionmaking, courts still regularly employ heuristic cognitive devices and self-
referential "common sense" in their selective use (and nonuse) of social science, 
leading to both sanist and pretextual outcomes. It is imperative that scholars, 
researchers and participants in the justice system confront this reality. 
V. NEED FOR CONFRONTATION 
A. Introduction 
Until we articulate the roots of the legal system's sanist biases and pretextual decision-
making mechanisms and subsequently demonstrate how these biases infect the legal 
system's "read" of social science data, we will not make any significant headway 
in creating a coherent framework for the consideration of social science data in 
mental disability law cases. A review of the caselaw reflects several specific overarching 
incoherences and dissonances that dominate this area of jurisprudence. 
In a wide variety of jurisprudential cont~xts-competency determinations, civil 
commitments hearings, trials involving mentally disabled criminal defendants-
social science is used (or not used) teleologically. 105 When a court wishes to avoid 
confronting the empirical reality known to· all behavioralists that competency is a 
fluid state and that one can be competent for some purposes and not for others, 106 
it sticks its head in the legal sand and says, basically, "This is too much for us 
to try to figure out."107 When a fact-finder "knows" (because it comports with 
the judge's own self-referential/aux common sense) that a rejection of a civil commit-
ment application will exacerbate urban homelessness, he simply says that it will, 
without reference to any of the extensive sociological and behavioral data base that 
has carefully weighed this question. 108 
Other examples abound. 109 To some extent, the principle of "cognitive disso-
nance"-the tendency of individuals to reinterpret information or experience that 
conflicts with their intemaliy accepted or publicly stated beliefs in order to avoid 
the inconsistent state that much inconsistencies producel1°-may be operative here. 
Judges wish to avoid overt consideration of social science data that "conflicts with 
10
' See Tanford, supra note 7, at 151 (discussing critiques of social science as a decisionmaking tool 
that mas.ks the true political and ideological bases of judicial decisions). 
106 See, e.g., sources cited in Perlin, supra note 21, manuscript at 85-87 nn.204-47 . 
101 See, e.g., Monahan &Walker, supra note 8, at 511 n.119. 
108 See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 21, manuscript at 107--08 (discussing decision in In re Melton, discussed 
supra text accompanying notes 53-53; compare sources cited in Perlin, supra note 20, at 94-108. 
·
109 See, e.g. , sources cited in Perlin, supra note 4, manuscript at 87-91 (on the relationship between 
a patient's likelihood to self-medicate in the community and an involuntary civil commitment finding); 
David Ferleger, Anti-Institutionalization and the Supreme Court, 14 RUTGERS L. J. 595, 628-32 (1983). 
110 See Perlin, supra note 24, at 139; Bruce Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment: The Distinction 
Between Assent and Objection, 28 Hous. L. REV. 15, 46-51 & n .103 (1991). See generally LEON FESTINGER, 
A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE ( 1957); ROBERT WICKLUND & JACK BREHM, PERSPECTIVES ON COGNI· 
TIVE DISSONANCE (1976) . 
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their internally accepted or publicly stated beliefs;" the result is a retreat to the 
use of sanist myths and pretextual decisions. 
In this way, courts allow themselves to avoid the confrontation of the hard value 
choices that underlie many of the cases in question. This contributes further to 
the antitherapeutic quality of mental disability jurisprudence. At a time when scholars 
?ave begun to develop and refine the concept of "therapeutic jurisprudence," it 
is especially important that we consider its relationship to sanist case law and pretex-
tual decisionmaking. 
B. Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
"Therapeutic jurisprudence" studies the role of the law as a therapeutic agent. 111 
This perspective recognizes that substantive rules, legal procedures and lawyers' 
roles may have either therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences, and questions 
Whether such rules, procedures and roles can or should be reshaped so as to enhance 
their therapeutic potential, while not subordinating due process principles. 112 
Although an impressive body of literature has been produced, 113 there has not 
Yet been a systematic investigation into the reasons why some courts decide cases 
"th . erapeutically' and others "anti-therapeutically."114 Our preliminary conclusion 
is that sanism is such a dominant psychological force that it (1) distorts "rational" 
decisionmaking, (2) encourages (albeit on at least a partially-unconscious level) 
Pretextuality and teleology, and (3) prevents decisionmakers from intelligently and 
~oherently focusing on questions that are meaningful to therapeutic jurisprudential 
inquiries. 115 
The types of sanist decisions that we have just discussed operate in an ostensibly 
atherapeutic world; although some decisions are, in fact, therapeutic and others 
are, in fact, antitherapeutic, these outcomes seem to arise almost in spite of them-
selves.116 In short, we cannot make any_ lasting progress in "putting mental health 
111 , 
See THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 15; ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note J9; ~exler, Putting, supra note 15; David Wexler & Bruce Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Criminal 
us_nce Mental Health Issues, 16 MENT. & PHYS. DIS. L. RPTR. 225 (1992) hereinafter Wexler & Winick, 
Criminal Justice); Wexler, Changing, supra note 15; David Wexler & Bruce Winick, Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence as a New Approach to Mental Health Law Policy Analysis and Research, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979 
L~ 99 l) (hereinafter Wexler & Winick, New Approach). 
27 
David Wexler, Health Care Compliance Principles and the Insanity Acquiuee Conditional Release Process, 
113 CRIM. L. Bull. 18, 19 n.5. See generally Wexler, Putting, supra note 15. 
114 See Wexler &Winick, New Approach, supra note 111, at 981 n.9. 
~ two earlier papers, Perlin considered the reasons for the incoherence of insanity defense decision-
lllaking, and concluded that any inquiry into such a question must take into account the impact of 
SYi:nbolism and mythology in the unconscious ways that judges and lawmakers react to such cases, as 
Well as the simplifying cognitive devices (heuristics) that drive such decisionmaking. See Perlin, supra 
n~te l; Perllin, supra note 6. On how the relationship between heuristics and courts' reception of social 
~:;ience data is frequently pretextual, see Perlin, supra note 4, manuscript at 73-77. 
See M.. Perlin, "Law as a Therapeutic and Anti-Therapeutic Agent," paper presented at the Massachu-
setts Department of Mental Health's Division of Forensic Mental Health's annual conference, Auburn, 
~ (!'1ay 1992) (suggesting that influence of sanism must be considered in therapeutic jurisprudence 
:~vesugations). 
tr See, e.g., discussions in Wexler & Winick, New Approach, supra note 111, at 990-92 (right to refuse 
te:atment), 992-?7 (treatment ofi?c_ompet~nt_ death r~w inmates), and 997-1001 (treatment ofincompe-
Pl cy to stand tnal); Wexler & Wm1ck, Cnmmal Justice, supra note 111, at 229-30 (sex offender guilty 
fi eas). See also, Michael L. Perlin, Tarasoff and the Dilemma of the Dangerous Patient: New Directions 
;r the 1990's, 16 I.Aw & PSYCH0L. REV. 29, 54-62 (1992) (duty to protect in tort law); Perlin, supra si: 5, a_t 54 (right to refuse treatment). See generally, I PERLIN, supra note 17, §LOSA, at 4-7, and 
ces Cited ( 199 l pocket part). 
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into mental health law" 117 until we confront the system's sanist biases and the ways 
that these sanist biases blunt our ability to intelligently weigh and assess social science 
data in the creation of a mental disability law jurisprudence. 
C. Some Prescriptions for Future Behavior 
First, it is essential that the issues discussed in this paper be added to the research 
agendas of social scientists, behaviorists and legal scholars. 118 Researchers must care-
fully examine case law and statutes to determine the extent to which social science 
is being teleologically used for sanist ends. They must also study the way that judges 
treat litigants who are perceived to be mentally disabled and how such litigants 
respond to that judicial treatment. 119 They must also study empirical inquiries into 
the extent of mentally disabled persons' knowledge about either their legal rights 
or their medication regimens. 120 These inquiries will help illuminate the ultimate 
impact of sanism on this area of the law, aid lawmakers and other policymakers 
in understanding the ways that social science data is manipulated to serve sanist 
ends, and assist in the formulation of both normative and instrumental strategies 
that can be used to rebut sanism in the legal system. 
Second, lawyers representing mentally disabled individuals must familiarize them-
selves with this data. The track record of lawyers representing the mentally disabled 
has ranged from indifferent to wretched;121 in one famous survey, lawyers were 
so bad that a patient had a better chance of being released at a commitment hearing 
ifhe appeared prose. 1.22 Further, simply educating lawyers about psychiatric technique 
and psychological nomenclature does not materially improve lawyers' performance 
where underlying attitudes are not changed. 123 If counsel is to become even minimally 
117 See Wexler, Putting, supra note 15. 
118 See also Perlin, supra note 9, at 375-77, 406; Perlin, supra note 4, manuscript at 111 (same) : Compare 
Perlin, supra note 17, at 58-59 (calling for similar scholarly inquiries into effectiveness and role of counsel 
in the representation of mentally disabled individuals). 
119 Recent studies thus show that judges rarely (and in some cases never) inform patients before them 
at involuntary civil commitment hearings that there is a right to counsel, a right to seek voluntary admission 
or a right to appeal a commitment order. Charles Parry & Eric Turkheimer, Length of Hospitalization 
and Outcome of Commitment and Recommitment Hearings, 43 HOSP. & COMMUN. PSYCHIATRY 65, 66 
(1992). 
120 See, e.g., Paul Wolpe et al., Psychiatric Inpatients' Knowledge of Their Rights, 42 HOSP. & COMMUN, 
PSYClflATRY 1168 (1991) (over half of patients tested had no recollection of having heard their legal 
rights explained to them upon admission to hospital) (patients institutionalized in large, urban, university-
affiliated hospital); Cathryn Clary et al., Psychiatric Inpatients' Knowledge of Medication at Hospital Discharge, 
43 Hosp, & COMMUN. PSYCHIATRY 140 (1992) (more than half of patients released from similar facility 
did not know the name or appropriate dosage of antipsychotic medications prescribed for them, or 
why they were being asked to take these medications) . 
121 See Perlin, supra note 17, at 43-45. See also Steven Schwartz, Damage Actions as a Strategy for Enhancing 
the Quality of Care of Persons With Mental Disabilities, 17 N .Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 651, 662 
(1989- 90) (describing "wholesale lack of legal advocacy" available to patients in public mental institu-
ti=~- . 
122 Elliot Andalman & David Chambers, Effective Counsel for Persons Facing Civil Commitment: A Survey, 
a Polemic, and a Proposal, 45 Miss. L. J. 43, 72 (1974) . One half of the lawyers assigned to represent 
individuals in civil commitment cases in Dallas were unaware of the existence of either of the two treatises 
written specifically about Texas's mental health law. Daniel Shuman & Richard Hawkins, The Use of 
Alternatives to Institutionalization of the Mentally m, 33 Sw. L.J. 1181, 1193-94 (1980). 
121 Norman Poythress, Psychiatric Expertise in Civil Commitment: Training Attorneys to Cope With Expert 
Testimony, 2 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 15 (1978). 
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competent in this area, it is critical that the underlying issues here be confronted. 124 
:his is underscored by judges' lack of basic. knowledge about mental disability law; 
10 one astonishing case, a Louisiana civil commitment order was reversed where 
th . 1 
e tna court did not even know of the existence of a state-mandated Mental Health 
Advocacy service.12s 
M Third, system decisionmakers should study the steps recently outlined by John 
onahan _and Laurens Walker for courts to adhere to when addressing questions 
concerning human behavior. 126 They should then assess the potential impact on 
developments in mental disability law if these steps were to be followed, as well 
as ~~ extent to which adherence to these proposals could minimize teleological 
?ecisionmaking. If courts genuinely did follow these recommendations-and, for 
instance, began to "evaluate . . . available research by determining whether the 
research has survived the critical review of the scientific community, has used valid 
res h · ~arc methods, ... and is supported by a body of related research"127-the "rea-
~oning" in decisions such as Barefoot, Jones, and Parham is certainly less likely to 
e r~peated in future litigation. 
h Finally, system decisionmakers must regularly engage in a series of "sanism 
c eeks" to insure-to the greatest extent possible-a continuing conscious and self-
reflective evaluation of their decisions to best avoid sanism's pernicious power. We 
n_eed to take what we learn from therapeutic jurisprudence to strip away sanist beha-
VJ.or and pretextual reasoning and provide real lawyers at real hearings (at which 
real inquiries are made as to mental status, need for commitment, availability of f eat_ment and restrictivity of institutionalization) for mentally disabled individuals . 
. f this Were to be done, the pretextual use of social science data could be confronted 
inan · open and meaningful way. 
D. Conclusion 
Sanist thinking dominates legal disc~urse and infects legal aecisionmaking. To 
accommodate sanist influences, judges frequently decide mental disability cases pre-
textually. In doing this, they read social science data teleologically so as to confirm 
Pre-held beliefs but so as to avoid the cognitive dissonance or psychological reactance 
~at Would be caused if they were forced to confront data or evidence that conflicted 
With their faux OCS. All of this generally operates on an unconscious level. 
M~ntal disability is no longer-if it ever was-an obscure subspeciality of legal 
Pra:tice and study. Each of its multiple strands forces us to make hard social policy 
~hoices about troubling social issues-psychiatry and social control, the use of institu-
tions ·nt, 1 · h. b bl. . ' i ormed consent, personal autonomy, the re anons ip etween pu ic percep-
!:n a_nd_ social reality, the many levels of "co_m~etency," the ~ole of free will in 
h cnminal law system, the limits of confidentiality, the protection duty of mental 
ealth Professionals, the role of power in forensic evaluations. These are all difficult 
~~ . . . . . 
inact a rare Judicial acknowledgement of the impact of lawyer mcompetency m another area where 
199 t)quate c_o~sel leads to morally intolerable result~, se~ Engber~,v. Meyer, 8,20. P.2d 70, 1, 04_ (Wyo. 
de · (Urb1gkit, C. J., dissenting in part & concumng m part) ( We ... let chiropractors with law 
di:eUtip~rf?nn the equivalent of brain surgery in capital cases, and, predictably, the 'patient' often 
'" In ~ s is intolerable."), 
"' S ~-P.K., 516 So. 2d 1323, 1325 (La. App. 1987). 
'" ldee 0 nahan & Walker, supra note 8, at 582-84. 
• at 583. 
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and complex questions that are not susceptible to easy, formulistic answers. When 
sanist thinking distorts the judicial process, the resulting doctrinal incoherence should 
not be a surprise. 
David Wexler, Bruce Winick and others have embarked upon an important and 
exciting enterprise in the study of therapeutic jurisprudence. This, though, is just 
one step toward the reconstruction of mental disability law. We must also-simulta-
neously-confront the law's sanist roots and pretextual biases in all policy arenas: 
the courtroom, the legislature, the practicing bar, the academy. Only then, will 
an understanding of mental disability law jurisprudence, truly, begin. 
